Objecthood - Objecthood One of the more vexed topics of metaphysics and ontology concerns what might be called objects, or objecthood: what general claims can we make about the meaning of talk of objects--bodies such as rocks, trees, as well as (arguably) minds? The leading theories on this admittedly-vague question have it that objects are either substances, which are in some sense distinct from their properties, or else no more than bundles of their properties. The topic is sometimes called "the problem of substance." What the problem is and is not Maybe the notion of an object is primitive: it cannot be explained any further. A word is primitive if it is meaningful but not capable of being defined. Moreover, if the notion of objecthood cannot be explained.
Bundle theory - The bundle theory, a theory in metaphysics and ontology about objecthood, is the view that an object is a bundle, or collection, of properties. Hence, one cannot even conceive of a propertyless object: the object just is its properties, and so if you take away its properties you take away the object itself. To illustrate, think of an apple, but do not think of its color, of its shape, of the fact that it is a kind of fruit, of the cells that its made of, of its taste, and so on. Think of the apple, but do not think of any of its properties. Is that possible? The bundle theorist says it is not possible. So the apple is no more than a collection of properties. There isn't any more.
Category of being - hoped, moreover, that a full account of the categories would be exhaustive in the sense that everything can be placed into at least one of the categories. Sometimes ontological category schemes have included nonexistent or even impossible objects; Meinong, who thought we can talk unobjectionably about nonexistent objects such as the golden mountain, was an ontologist. For example, what it means to take the category physical object seriously as a category of being is to assert that the concept of physical objecthood cannot be reduced to or explicated in any other terms—not, for example, in terms of bundles of properties. In this way, as it turns out, very many controversies of ontology can be understood as controversies about exactly which categories should be regarded as the (fundamental, irreducible, primitive) categories. Category.
Substance - as well as early modern traditions that follow it, substances are treated as having attributess and modes. See objecthood and substance theory. See also: chemical substance simple:Substance.
Substance theory - or substance attribute theory, a theory in metaphysics and ontology about objecthood, is the view that an object is something over and above the properties that inhere in it. In plain terms (theories of the inherence relation aside), to say that properties "inhere" in a thing is simply to say that the thing has those properties. According to the substance theory, in at least some sense, the substance can exist or can be distinguished from its properties. Even if it is physically impossible that a substance would lack any properties at all, we can speak of the substance itself as distinguished from its properties. A substance considered by itself, considered without any reference to its properties, is what has been called a "bare particular." It is "bare" because it is considered.
Subjective idealism - phenomenalism, the view that physical objects, properties, events, etc. (whatever is physical) are reducible to mental objects, properties, events, etc. Thus reality is ultimately made up of only mental objects, properties, events, etc. See also Objecthood.
Object - supported mechanism for binding data tightly with methods that operate on that data. object (task) direct object and indirect object (grammar) categories in mathematics contain objects. For instance, the monster group is an object in the category of all groups. See objecthood..
Object (philosophy) - relation, is the basic problem of semantics. Objects are often treated as types of particulars, but occasionally, philosophers see fit to speak of abstract objects--Platonic forms would be an example. Much, much more at objecthood.
Metaphysics - the same respect." A particular apple cannot both exist and not exist at the same time. It can't be all red and all green at the same time. So that was the Aristotelian conception of metaphysics. Universal science or first philosophy treats of "being qua being"--that is, what is basis to all science before one adds the particular details of any one science. This includes matters like causality, substance, species, and elements. Table of contents showTocToggle("show","hide") 1 Examples 2 Metaphysical subdisciplines 3 Metaphysical topics and problems 4 Metaphysical jargon 5 See also Examples It is sometimes difficult to understand what the issues even are, in metaphysics. It might help to begin with a fairly simple example that will help to introduce the problems of metaphysics. Imagine now that we are in.
